From Is to Ought

Had Broker said:

  1. Climate changes because of CO2.
  2. There are risks coming from (1).
  3. Reducing CO2 emissions would reduces risks caused by (1).

he would be immune to Judy’s criticism. They all are factual claims. Yet it’s quite clear that we can hear what to infer from these factual claims.

Why is that? Because we listen to a broker B with some action A in mind. This action has some relevance R to the topic T under discussion.

The formula is therefore B x A x R x T.

BART.

(Source: ourchangingclimate.wordpress.com)

Truth or Reason?

Thank you for your peaceful gesture.

I’m sure you noted that this:

When dealing with psychological data it’s extremely unwise to infer fake data from outrageous responses.

has yet to be answered and that this lack of answer is quite a tell about the kind of pea and thimble game that is being played in the auditing sciences.

I believe this just reinforces Jonathan Haidt’s point:

Anyone who values truth should stop worshiping reason. We all need to take a cold, hard look at the evidence and see reasoning for what it is.

http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/30/hope-for-reason/

While I still hope for reason (based on evidence like #5), climate blogland is becoming quite depressing, really.

(Source: faustusnotes.wordpress.com)

(via Cartoon: Prove it’s your hat)

Burdened by Proof

The plethora of memes Carrick just bloated deserves due diligence. But since Carrick insists, we can talk a bit about shifting the burden of proof. This won’t take long.

Read More

(Source: moyhu.blogspot.ca)

Heavy rainfall may be the cause of flooding, but we should not normally regard the fact that no flooding occurs as a cause of the absence of rain.

The More I Know

[Alex Heyworth syllogizes.]

Knowledge is power. Power corrupts. Corruption is a crime.

Crime doesn’t pay.

Therefore, the more I know the poorer I get.

(Source: judithcurry.com)

A strawman can itch both ways.

JCH, scratching both ways.

Model and Model

> [M]odeling results have no truth value. In modal logic we would say they express possibility, not (physical) necessity, or even probability.

It would be interesting to know in which modal logic does not have truth values. Modalities qualify the truth of a judgment, they do not eliminate truth:

Read More

(Source: judithcurry.com)

Denial Logic

Nullius,

Aristotle’s logic is a term logic, not a propositional logic.

To falsify A, you need to show that C does not follow from B.

In other words, A is false if and only C is false when B is true.

By rejecting B, which is a standard result of all attempts at economic modelling that Annan is aware of you have no business stating anything about the validity of A.

Another strategy would be to deny A because it’s justified:

Denial Logic DL, a system of justification logic, is the logic of an agent whose justified beliefs are false, who cannot avow his own propositional attitudes or believe tautologies, but who can believe contradictions.

http://arxiv.org/abs/1203.0389

This logic might appeal to gaming theorists.

(Source: collide-a-scape.com)

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